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FORT PROPERTIES, INC. V. AMERICAN
MASTER LEASE LLC
671 F.3D 1317 (FED. CIR. 2012)
1. INTRODUCTION

In Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease LLC,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered
a patent holder's appeal from a decision of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, which granted
summary judgment in favor of Fort Properties, Inc. 2 Fort
Properties, Inc. ("Fort Properties") sought declaratory judgment
that it had not infringed the American Master Lease LLC ("AML")
patent.' The District Court held that all claims of AML's patent
failed to meet the subject matter eligibility requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 101.4 The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's
holding after considering the case in light of the Supreme Court's
recent precedent.' Additionally, the court discussed the propriety
of tying claims involving otherwise unpatentable subject matter to
computers in order to satisfy § 101 requirements.' The case began
with a description of the patent at issue and the reasons underlying
the district court's decision to invalidate the claims of AML's
patent.7 Then, the Federal Circuit performed its analysis of the
claims of AML's patent under the guidance of the Supreme
Court's holding in Bilski v. Kappos.' Finally, the Federal Circuit
concluded that all of AML's claims were invalid, including those
with computer limitations.9

1. Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1317.
7. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1317.
8. Id. at 1322-24.
9. Id. at 1324.
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II. BACKGROUND

AML's patent covered an investment tool, Patent No. 6,292,788
("the '788 patent"), which disclosed a method that allowed
property owners to buy and sell property without incurring tax
liabilities.o The '788 patent contained forty-one claims wherein
the first thirty-one did not contain any computer limitations."
Claim one is typical of the claims in the '788 disclosure:
1. A method of creating a real estate investment
instrument adapted for performing tax-deferred
exchanges comprising: aggregating real property to
form a real estate portfolio; encumbering the
property in the real estate portfolio with a master
agreement; and creating a plurality of deedshares by
dividing the title in the real estate portfolio into a
plurality of tenant-in-common deeds of at least one
predetermined denomination, each of the plurality
of deedshares subject to a provision in the master
agreement for reaggregating the plurality of tenantin-common deeds after a specified interval. 2
Ordinarily, property owners must pay a tax on proceeds
generated from real estate sales." However, the Internal Revenue
Code provides an exception to the general rule, found under 26
U.S.C. § 1031, allowing the owner to avoid incurring a tax under
certain circumstances. 4 The investment tool disclosed by the '788
patent was designed to take advantage of this exception."

10. Id. at 1318.
11. Id. at 1319.
12. Id.
13. Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1318.
14. Id. One circumstance allowing the tax exception to be taken advantage
of requires that: (1) the value of the purchased property is greater than or equal
to the value of the sold property; (2) the debt burdening the purchased property
is greater than or equal to the debt burdening the sold property; (3) the
purchased property is identified within 45 days of the sold property's date of
sale, and the entire acquisition is completed within 180 days; and (4) the real
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The method claimed in the '788 patent required a series of
steps.' 6 First, the method required the aggregation of a number of
properties into a real estate portfolio. 7 Next, the properties were
to be divided into shares, called deedshares, and sold to investors.
Each deedshare could be encumbered by its own mortgage,
providing the owners with the ability to structure their debts to
take advantage of the tax exception." Additionally, the method
employed a master tenant to oversee the portfolio and to perform
administrative tasks such as paying insurance, property taxes, and
rents.20 Further, a master agreement governed the portfolio and
permitted the deedshares to be reaggregated after a set period of
time.2' Finally, the claimed method employed the use of a
qualified intermediary to facilitate sales and purchases of the
deedshares in compliance with the § 1031 tax exception.22
Independent claim 32 contained an additional limitation requiring
a computer to generate the plurality of deedshares.23
The district court held all forty-one claims of the '788 patent
invalid for failing to claim patent-eligible subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because they attempted to capture abstract subject
matter.24 Section 101 states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of
The district court utilized the "machine-orthis title." 25
transformation" test in making its determination. 26 The machine-

estate owner does not exercise control over the proceeds from the sold property
before acquiring the purchased property. See 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006).
15. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1318.

16. Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 1318-19.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1319.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1324.

25. Id. at 1320 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
26. Id. at 1319.
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or-transformation test is a two-pronged inquiry that requires an
applicant to show that a process claim satisfies § 101 by either
showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by
showing that his claim transforms an article.2 7 Regarding the
machine prong, the district court found that the claims were not
sufficiently tied to any particular machine or apparatus. 28 The
district court relied on the fact that AML had previously
represented during patent prosecution that the methods need not be
performed by a computer. 29 Regarding the transformation prong,
the district court found that none of the claims of the patent
transformed an article to a different state or thing because the
claimed deedshares represented only a legal interest in property,
Therefore, the
not the actual physical deed documents.30
deedshares began as merely abstract legal concepts, and were
incapable of physical transformation. Thus, based on the machineor-transformation test, the district court held all the claims of the
'788 patent invalid.'
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Based on an analysis of the claims in relation to precedent, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court in holding the '788
claims invalid for failing to satisfy the subject matter requirements
of 35 U.S.C.§ 101.32 On appeal before the Federal Circuit, AML
argued that the claims of the '788 patent constituted a patentable
process, not an abstract idea, because they required a series of
steps that involved physical objects such as real property, deeds,
and contracts that operate in the real world.3 In response, Fort
Properties argued that the claimed method consisted entirely of
mental processes and abstract intellectual concepts.34 The court
27. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d. 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
28. Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1319.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1324.
33. Id. at 1322 (appealing the District Court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Fort Properties).
34. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1322.
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began its patentability analysis by noting that the Supreme Court
has held that certain subject matter can never be patentable: laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." At issue on
appeal was whether the real estate investment tool was a
patentable process or an abstract idea.
To analyze the issues of § 101 patentability, the court began
with a discussion of "[flour seminal Supreme Court precedents."
Using the framework of those cases, the court went on to
determine whether claims one through thirty-one of the '788 patent
met the patentable subject matter requirements of § 101." These
claims did not include a computer-based restriction. Finally, the
court analyzed the patentability of the remaining claims under the
same framework.39 These claims included the concepts from the
earlier claims, as well as a limitation that the method must
incorporate the use of a computer.40
A. Precedent
The Federal Circuit initially noted that the district court analysis
regarding § 101 patentability requirements was restricted to a
review solely under the "machine-or-transformation" test created
by the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski.41 However, the Supreme
Court's decision in Bilski v. Kappos42 limited the significance of
the machine-or-transformation test by holding that it was a useful
and important test, but not dispositive under a § 101 inquiry.43
Therefore, the Federal Circuit had to reexamine the merits of
AML's claims under the framework of the Supreme Court's § 101
precedent.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1320 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010)).
Id.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1323.
Id. at 1320 (citing Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943).
Id. (citing Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3218).
Id. (citing Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3227).
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First, the court analyzed Gottschalk v. Benson," in which the
patent at issue disclosed an algorithm for converting binary-coded
decimal numerals into pure binary code.45 The Supreme Court
held this was an unpatentable abstract idea.46 According to the
Court, allowing the patent to stand would in practical effect allow
a patent on the algorithm itself, which is outside the limits of
patentable subject matter."
Next, the court examined Parker v. Flook48 , where the patent at
issue was an algorithm designed to enable the monitoring of
conditions during a catalytic conversion process in the
petrochemical and oil-refining industries.49 The court held that the
algorithm was unpatentable.5 o Although the claim language
restricted the patent to the petrochemical and oil-refining
industries, the court stated that "[t]he notion that post-solution
activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process
exalts form over substance."'
Third, the court discussed Diamond v. Diehr52 , where the patent
at issue disclosed a method for molding raw uncured synthetic
rubber into cured precision products.5 ' The Supreme Court held
the invention patentable under § 101 because it was not an attempt
to patent an abstract idea, but rather an industrial process for
molding rubber products. 54 The Supreme Court stated that when a
claim containing a mathematical formula implements that formula
in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole,
performs a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or
44. Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
45. Id. at 1320 (citing Gottschalk,409 U.S. at 64-67).
46. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1320.
47. Id. (citing Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64-67).
48. Id. at 1321 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
49. Id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-86).
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
52. Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1321 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981)).
53. Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177).
54. Id.
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thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of §101." Thus,
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
known structure or process may well be patentable subject
matter."6
Finally, the court considered the recent Supreme Court decision
in Bilski v. Kappos ." There, the patent involved a method by
which buyers and sellers of commodities could protect, or hedge,
against the risk of price changes." The Supreme Court reasoned
that the claims explained the basic concept of hedging, which is an
unpatentable abstract idea, like the algorithms in Benson and
Flook." The patent at issue in Bilski v. Kappos, if valid, would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea, which is not
allowed in our patent system.60 The Court again rejected the
notions of post-solution activity and field of use restrictions.
B. Claims 1-31
Fort Properties' claims one through ten and twenty-two through
thirty-one disclose aggregating real property into a real estate
portfolio, dividing the interests in the portfolio into a number of
deedshares, and subjecting those deedshares to a master
agreement."1 Claims eleven through twenty-one disclose how
property can be bought and sold under this arrangement in a
manner that permits a tax-deferred exchange.6 2 The Federal
Circuit determined that the claims did not meet the requirements of
§ 101.63 Similar to the patent at issue in Bilski, the claims here
were not sufficiently tied to the physical world to avoid being
In Bilski, the claims involved
deemed abstract ideas.'
commodities and money, which are similar to AML's claims
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1321 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187).
Id.
Id. (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223).
Id. at 1322 (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231).
Id. (referencing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231).
Id.
FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1322.
Id.
Id.
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involving deeds, contracts, and real property. 65 The Federal
Circuit noted that in both cases the connection to the real world
was not sufficient to transform the abstract legal concepts into
patentable subject matter.6 6 Likewise, the claims in Flook had ties
to the real world, but, similar to the claims here and in Bilski, the
ties were too tenuous to create patentable subject matter.
Thus, the Federal Circuit held claims one through thirty-one
invalid, relying on the attenuated relationship between the abstract
concepts contained in the claims and the physical objects in which
they were embodied.68 Commodities, money, contracts, deeds and
real property were put into the same category of tangible means
connecting an abstract idea to reality, yet their tangible form was
not enough to overcome the lack of connection elsewhere in the
claim.69 Additionally, the court noted that "[tihe dispositive issue
was whether the claim as a whole recite[d] sufficient physical
activity to constitute patentable subject matter."" When the claims
of the '788 patent were analyzed as a whole, they failed to
constitute patentable subject matter.7 '
C. Claims 32-41

The Federal Circuit first noted that the remaining claims of the
'788 patent had the same insufficient ties to the physical world as
the first thirty-one claims for the reasons discussed above.7 2
However, these claims had an additional limitation that required a
computer to generate the plurality of deedshares.7 ' The court held
that the requirement of a computer in this instance was insufficient
to make the claims valid.74
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1323.
69. Id. at 1322.
70. Id. (citing In re Shrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). See also In
re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
71. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1322.
72. Id. at 1323.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1324.
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In holding the claims invalid, the Federal Circuit discussed its
own recent precedents. First, the court discussed CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., where it explained that the basic
character of a process claim drawn to an abstract idea is not
changed by claiming only its performance by computers, or by
claiming the process embodied in program instructions on a
computer readable medium.7 6 Essentially, the court stated that "the
use of the machine must impose meaningful limits on the claim's
scope."77 As a contrasting example, the court discussed the patent
in Ultramercial,LLC v. Hulu, LLC, which required the use of a
In contrast to CyberSource, the court
computer in its claims.
noted that the addition of a computer to Ultramercial's claims was
not merely insignificant post-solution activity, but that the
invention involved advances in computer technology. 79 Thus, the
invention was sufficient to qualify under the eligibility
requirements of § 101 " On the other hand, the court noted that in
Dealertrack,Inc. v. Huber," a method of applying for credit did
not satisfy § 101 because the claim was silent as to how the
invention was to be computer aided.82 Thus, simply adding a
computer aided limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept,
without more, is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible."
Using the prior cases as a guide, the court held claims thirty-two
through forty-one of the '788 patent invalid.84 The computer-aided
restriction did not play a significant role in permitting the claimed
method to be performed." More specifically, the claims only
required the computer to generate a plurality of deedshares, and
75. Id. (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
76. Id. at 1323 (quoting Cybersource, 645 F.3d at 1375).
77. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Bilski 545 F.3d at 961).
78. Id. (citing Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
79. Id. (citing Ultramercial,657 F.3d at 1329).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
82. Id. (quoting Dealertrack,674 F.3d at 1333 ).
83. FortProps., 671 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Dealertrack,674 F.3d at 1333).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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such a requirement did not impose a meaningful limit on the claim
scope in this case. 6
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the court's
decision in Fort Properties. First, this case gives additional
guidance on the concept of abstract ideas regarding § 101
patentability requirements, especially where the claims contain
computer limitations. Second, the case highlights the precarious
footing many business method patents have in patentability. These
conclusions have an important impact on patent drafting and will
likely alter the way that patent prosecutors draft claims.
Additionally, these conclusions give an insight into what the
Federal Circuit will hold in future cases involving computer
limited claims.
Fort Properties makes an important addition to the field of
§ 101 patentability requirements. As a result of this decision,
future patent applicants are sure to include much stronger
"computer restriction" language. One article states that "patents
directed to emerging medical and financial technologies or
mathematical principles might fare better in a subject matter
challenge if computer or human interaction is an integral and
important aspect for achieving desired results."" Echoing this
view, in the recent case of Bancorp Services, LLC v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada, the Federal Circuit noted that for the
computer limitation to be used to make an otherwise abstract idea
patent eligible, it must play a "significant part of the performance
of the invention."88
CLS Bank Internationalv. Alice Corp. Ltd. also modifies § 101
analysis by stating that the court's determination of patent

86. Id.
87. Patrick C. Keane & Shawn B. Cage, The U.S. Supreme Court Trumps the
Federal Circuit Procedure and the Thresholdfor Analyzing Subject Matter
Eligibility of Patents, BLOOMBERG BNA, May 14, 2012, available at 2012 WL
1652209.
88. Bancorp Servs. LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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eligibility must incorporate all the claims, and a court cannot distill
the patent down to its basic concepts without taking into account
the totality of the claims." In determining eligibility, the court
must evaluate the claims based on what they recite, not on a
distillation of the ideas they contain."o Thus, if the totality of the
claims does not convey that the computer limitation plays a
significant role in the claimed invention, then the § 101 patent
eligibility requirements are not met. 9'
Many of the Federal Circuit's most recent § 101 cases highlight
the precarious footing of many issued business method patents. In
Fort Properties, the patentee believed, and the Patent Office
agreed, that the real property limitations of the first thirty-one
claims had sufficient ties to the real world. The large number of
these patents that have issued and have been subsequently
invalidated seems to show a general distaste for business method
patents. This is evidenced by post grant review for covered
business method patents, as well as many recent cases in the
judicial system.92
Finally, an interesting trend has begun to develop in which § 101
jurisprudence has taken the forefront of the Supreme Court's
patent docket. 9 3 Based on the expansive analysis that has emerged,
it has been suggested that there is an overlap in judicial
interpretation of §101 and §103, in that if a claim appears to fail
89. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
90. Id
91. Id, reh'g en banc granted,CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Ltd, No. 20111301, 2012 WL 4784336, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2012) (addressing (1) the test
to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is an ineligible abstract
idea, and (2) whether it is relevant that a computer-implemented invention is
claimed as a method, system, or storage medium).
92. See, e.g., Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1318; CLS Bank Int'l, 685 F.3d at
1341; Bancorp, 678 F.3d at 1266. See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.300-.304 (2012)
(creating the rules for a special species of post grant review for covered business
method patents).
93. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); and Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (2012),
cert. grantedsub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
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§103, there is a high likelihood that it will fail §101 as well.94 in
the past, the Supreme Court has exercised cautious jurisprudence
regarding this connection, stating that the determinations are
distinct as there is uncertainty about what future innovations will
entail.95
However, in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories,Inc. the Supreme Court noted that precedent insists
that a process that focuses on the use of a natural law contain an
"inventive concept" sufficient to ensure that the patent amounts to
significantly more than a patent on the law of nature itself.96
There, the claims at issue covered processes for determining
optimal drug dosage for patients based on the correlation between
metabolite levels in each patient's blood." The Court held the
patents invalid because the claims effectively covered the
underlying laws of nature themselves.9 8 Regarding the "inventive
concept," the Court stated that the claims did not satisfy this
requirement, and that the claims involved well-understood
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
Thus, one can argue that the Supreme Court has
field.99
incorporated § 103 at least in some respect to the analysis of
§ 101.'" While a full analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of
94. Interview with Anthony Volini, Professor, DePaul Law School, in Chi.,
111, (Oct. 17, 2012).
95. Id.; see Diehr, 475 U.S. at 176 (stating that the question of whether a
particular invention meets the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or
nonobvious requirement of § 103 "do[es] not affect the determination of
whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for
patent protection under § 101.").
96. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294 (2012).
97. Id. at 1295.
98. Id. at 1305.
99. Id. at 1294.
100. The argument has been advanced before, especially by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (the "CCPA"). See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959
(C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated as moot sub nom. See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
44 U.S. 1028 (1980). The CCPA has stated:
[W]e find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently
unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct statutory
provisions which are conceptually unrelated, namely, those
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this article, it is worth noting that Fort Properties avoided the
issue by relying on the lack of "physical ties" that AML's claims
had to the real world.
V. CONCLUSION

Fort Properties held that all claims of the '788 patent were
invalid, because they attempted to capture unpatentable abstract
subject matter.o'
The Federal Circuit noted that the claim
limitation requiring the use of a computer did not play a significant
role in the performance of the patented method.'0 2 This holding
reflects the Federal Circuit's attitude toward computer restricted
claims, while also cautioning patent prosecutors that insignificant
computer limitations will not transform abstract ideas into
patentable subject matter.
Meaningful computer limitations
require the computer to play an important role in the operability of
the claimed invention.
Daniel L. Organ*

pertaining to the Categories of inventions in § 101 which May
be patentable and to the Conditions for patentability
demanded by the statute for inventions within the statutory
categories, particularly the nonobviousness condition of §
103.

Id.
With the relatively high number of § 101 cases being decided by the Supreme
Court and as Flook is one of the Court's "seminal precedents," it will be
interesting to see if there is further commingling of§ 101 and § 103.
101. Fort Props., 671 F.3d at 1318.
102. Id. at 1324.
* J.D. Candidate 2014, DePaul University College of Law; B.S. Electrical
Engineering 2011, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would like to
thank Professor Anthony Volini and John Paul Kale for their valuable insight
and guidance.
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